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Recent theoretical work has argued that a small open economy should use
residence-hased but not source-based taxes on capital income. Given the ease
with which residents can evade domestic taxes on foreign earnings from
capital, however, a residence-based tax may not be administratively feasible,
leaving no taxes on capital income.
The objective of this paper is to explore possible reasons why capital-
income taxes have survived in the past, in spite of the above pressures. Any
bilateral approach, such as sharing of information among governments or
direct coordination of tax rates, suffers from the problem that the coalition
of countries is itself a small open economy, so subject to the same
pressures. Capital controls, preventing capital outflows, may well be a
sensible policy response and were in fact used by a number of countties.
Such controls have many drawbacks, however, and a number of countries are now
abandoning them.
The final hypothesis explored is that the tax-crediting conventions,
used to prevent the double taxation of international capital flows, served
also to coordinate tax rates. The paper shows that while no Nash equilibrium
in tax rates exists, given these tax-crediting conventions, a Stackelberg
equilibrium does exist if there is either a dominant capital exporter or a
dominant capital importer, in spite of the ease of tax evasion. While the
U.S. ,asthe dominant capital exporter during much of the postwar period, may
well have served as this Stackelberg leader, world capital markets are now
more complicated. These tax-crediting conventions may no longer be
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Can taxation of capital income survive the increasing integration of world capital mar-
kets? A number of recent papers suggest not. Diamond—Mirrlees(1971), for example,
showed that a small open economy would not choose to tax the income generated by the
physical capital located within the country —underan optimal tax system, production
would occur efficiently, which requires that domestic iuvestments earn the rate of return
available on the world capital market. In principle, a country might still attempt to tax
the income from the savings of its residents. However in practice, income from savings in-
vested outside the country is virtually impossible for a government to monitor. Individuals
therefore can evade tax on such savings with very little risk. As Razin—Sadka(1989) show,
such capital flight in theory eliminates any possibility of a tax on savingsinvestors will
simply transfer their funds abroad to avoid taxation.
In the past, perhaps enough countries were sufficiently closed, due to the costs of
transferring both goods and information across borders, that these pressures were relatively
manageable. When pressures were high enough, a number of countries (including several in
Europe) introduced capital controls, preventing residents from investing abroad, in order
to preserve this tax base.' But the European Community has agreed to eliminate these
controls in the near future, as they create an artificial barrier to economic integration within
the Community. Will the increasing openness of the E.C., and of the world economy more
generally, in fact lead to an erosion of capital income taxation, as the theory predicts?
As shown in Gordon(1983), even though any one country acting in isolation may not
choose to tax capital income, all countries acting together could well gain by jointly taxing
capital income. Any one country's attempt to increase its tax on capital income should
benefit other countries, if only by increasing the size of their tax base. These externalities
imply that the equilibrium outcome without coordination would result in rates which
This paper was written while I was visiting at the Mioistry of Finance in Lisbon. The Ministry takes
no responsibility for the rootents of the paper. I woold like to thank Vitor Gaspar for comments on an
earlier draft.are likely to be lower than would be chosen with coordination. What mechanisms are
available to enable countries to coordinate their tax policies? One mechanism would be
explicit treaties setting tax rates in all countries, which in principle could achieve any
desired outcome. But most countries would be loathe to give up their internal discretion
over the design of this important element of their tax structure. It is also not clear that
every country would gain by signing sucb a treaty. If participation were voluntary, would
the agreement be undermined if any one country chose not to participate?
Another mechanism would involve governments sharing information with each other
about the capital income of foreign residents, enabling these governments to enforce a
tax on the world—wide income of their residents. Such an agreement could easily be
undermined, however, by any one country, e.g. Switzerland, choosing not to participate.
In this paper, I show that existing conventions in many countries for the taxation of
foreign—source capital income, which prevent the double taxation of this income by having
the home country grant residents a tax credit towards their domestic income taxes for any
capital income taxes already paid to the host country, may well help coordinate capital tax
policies among countries. In particular, I show that under this convention capital income
taxes will end up being used by small open economies, in spite of the previous results. The
specific outcome depends on a variety of detailed assumptions, and only in extreme cases
would be equivalent to full coordination. However, the outcome may be close enough to
explain the prevalence of this convention and the absence of further coordination.
The organization of this paper is as follows: In section I, I show briefly the equilibrium
tax structure that would arise without any form of coordination among countries, showing
in particular the role of capital controls. Sections II and III then explore the equilibrium
under the above type of double—taxation convention. In section II, all international capital
flows take the form of direct investment by multinationals; while multinationals owe tax
to both the home and the host countries, their home country grants them a tax credit
for any taxes already paid to the host government. In section III, international capital
flows occur only through portfolio investments by individuals; while earnings abroad are
subject to withholding taxes, these tax payments are again credited against any income
taxes owed to the home government. Section IV then examines the implications of these
results for the process of tax coordination.
91. Equilibrium without coordination
I begin by examining briefly the equilibrium pattern of capital income taxation that
* wouldarise without the double—taxation convention if each country maximizes a standard
social welfare function, taking as given the policies chosen by other countries. This is the
setting of many of the past papers on capital income taxation.
Source—based taxes
As already noted, Diamond—Mirrlees(1971) showed that a small open economy should not
tax capital income at source. If capital is mobile internationally without cost, then any
attempt to do so simply lowers the return to immobile factors —ifthe return to capital were
lowered, investors would transfer their funds elsewhere and continue to earn the going rate
of return. But taxing capital income at source, unlike taxing the immobile factors directly,
distorts the decision to invest at home or abroad, and may distort the composition of goods
produced.2 As a result, taxing the immobile factors directly dominates, so no source—based
capital income tax should exist in small open ec000mies, regardless of the policies chosen
in other countries.3
To what degree does this result change if the assumptions are relaxed? Diamond—
Mirrlees(1971) assumed, for example, that all goods entering individual utility functions,
except for the numeraire good, were subject to tax. Yet Gordon(1986) shows the same
result assuming only that the immobile factors are subject to tax. What about pure profits?
In a closed economy setting, a pure—profits tax is nondistorting, so all pure profits would
be taxed away before any distorting taxes are used. But, if the profits are not tied to any
ooe geographic location, then a profits tax would simply induce profitable firms to move
elsewhere. Only profits tied to a particular location, e.g. profits from the exploitation of
natural resources, can be taxed.
If firms benefit from the existence of public services, would they be taxed under an
optimal tax system? If the services are pure public goods, then the benefits from providing
them to the firm accrue, as before, to immobile factors located in the country, not to
the firm's capital—owners. As before, it would be better to tax these immobile factors
directly rather than distort capital—allocation decisions. Only if a firm's use of the services
3imposes marginal costs should it be charged for these costs, in order to preserve productive
efficiency, but in proportion to the costs imposed rather than in proportion to capital
income.
If the country is large relative to the world capital market, then some intervention
would be called for. As shown in Gordon—Varian(19S9), the specific policy response would
depend critically on where it has market power. For example, if the amount of capital it
imports (exports) affects the interest rate it pays on this capital, then it has the incentive
to reduce net imports (exports) of capital in order to move the interest rate in a favorable
direction. This implies that the sign of any tax on capital investment should depend on the
direction of net capital flows. It is therefore difficult to rationalize existing tax structures
based on each country's desire to make use of this type of market power.4
Residence—based taxes
While Diamond—Mirrlees(1971) argued that source—based capital income taxes should not
be used, they did assume that income generated by all factor supplies was subject to tax,
including in this case capital income. In general, capital income could come from assets
invested anywhere in the world.5
Such a tax would be very difficult to enforce, however. In order to effectively tax any
source of income, a government must be able to monitor directly each individual's income
from this source. If its only information comes from the individual's tax return, then
the individual faces little risk in failing to report such income sources. In principle, any
domestic source of income can be monitored, if the government grants itself the enforcement
power. The U.S., for example, requires all firms and financial intermediaries to report to
U.S. tax authorities the earnings they pay out to each U.S. resident.6 A country cannot
require foreign firms and foreign financial intermediaries to make such reports, however.
Even if it could detect when capital reenters the country, and tax it then, such a tax could
be avoided simply by leaving funds abroad.
Yet if taxes can be evaded without risk on funds invested through foreign firms and
foreign financial intermediaries, then all capital income taxes can be so avoided. Investors
simply invest entirely through foreign entities, resulting in a "cross—hauling" of financial
4investments. An individual can still invest in domestic real assets as long as he does
so through a foreign financial intermediary in order to avoid detection by domestic tax
authorities. If interest payments are deductible for tax purposes, then investors can do
yet better by borrowing at home, deducting the resulting interest payments from their
taxable income, and investing all the funds abroad. If everyone behaves in this way, then
no revenue can be collected from an attempt to tax capital income, and revenue may even
be lost due to interest deductions.7 Razin—Sadka(1989) then argued that the optimal tax
on capital income is no tax at all.
At this point in time, perhaps only the largest savers are sophisticated enough to avoid
taxes in this way. But then any tax on income from savings is paid only by smaller savers,
making the tax much less equitable. In any case, individuals will quickly become more
sophisticated, helped by foreign financial intermediaries seeking extra business. Therefore,
even if a capital—income tax would currently collect revenue, and from wealthy enough
people to appear equitable, this cannot last for long. The tax base should continue to
erode, creating pressure to eliminate the tax entirely.
Role of capital controls
One response countries have chosen, given these pressures, is to impose capital controls
which prevent domestic residents from evading domestic capital income taxes by investing
abroad. Under certain assumptions, the outcome will be the same as would occur without
tax evasion.
Consider, for example, a simple economy with one representative individual who lives
for two periods. In the first period, he starts with assets A, which he either consumes then
or saves. Denote first—period consumption by C1 and savings by S, where S =A—C1.
During the second period, he works, supplying an amount of labor L, and consumes an
amount C equal to his labor income plus the return from his savings, net of any taxes.
Denote the net—of—tax wage rate he receives by w and the net—of—tax interest rate by r*,
p
sothat C =w*L+ r*S.
Domestic production in the second period equals f(K, L), where K is supplied either
through domestic savings or through international borrowing at the interest rate r. This
5output, the stock of savings, S, plus net receipts from foreign investments (minus net pay-
ments to foreign creditors), are used for domestic consumption plus government services,
C. The economy's resource constraint in the second period is therefore
S+f(K,L)+r(S—K)=C+G, (1)
where L, S, and C are each functions solely of A, r*, and w. The resulting utility of the
representative individual is W =U(r*,w*,A)+V(G). The objective of the government is
assumed to be to maximize W subject to the resource constraint (1).
If individuals can evade capital income taxes by investing abroad and the government
does oot use capital controls, then r* cannot be below r. Since the government cannot
collect revenue from a residence—based capital income tax, by the previous arguments it
will rely entirely on labor income taxes to finance C, choosing w to maximize W subject
to equation (1). Through use of capital controls, however, it should be able to do better.
Consider first the case of a capital—importing country. If the government prevents
domestic residents from investing abroad, then it can tax their income from savings without
constraint. Given capital imports, it can independently choose K through its choice of a
corporate tax rate. Then it would choose w, r, and K to maximize W subject to equation
(1). Differentiating with respect to K immediately shows that f' =r,implying an efficient
allocation of capital internationally, so no use of corporate taxes. Since the government's
choice problem is formally identical to what it would face without tax evasion, the optimal
values of w and r* are identical to the values chosen if the government could in fact
measure any foreign earnings.
What if the country is a net capital—exporter? Assume that capital controls can be
designed so that only p percent of each resident's savings can be invested abroad, but that
income earned on these foreign investments continues to evade tax. In this case, r* equals
a weighted average of the rate of return r earned on savings abroad, and the net—of—tax
return on domestic savings, with weights p and (1 —p).The government can choose r*
freely given p, at least over a certain range, through changing the tax rate on domestic
capital income. As before, it would design its policies so as to maximize W subject to
resource constraint (1), where K =(1
—p)S.Differentiating with respect to p, again
6shows that f' =r. Thechoice problem for randw is the same as before, implying that
the chosen values would again equal those chosen without tax evasion.
This conclusions would quickly be weakened when any number of complications are
added to the story. Uncertainty, for example, would create a desire for international diver-
sification which would be prevented by capital controls. If governments can monitor the
income from foreign investments made by domestic corporations, however, even though
individuals can evade taxes on their foreign portfolio holdings, then an alternative set of
controls is available which does not prevent international diversification. In particular, the
government can forbid individuals from investing abroad directly, but allow domestic cor-
porations to do so without restriction. Given that the resulting foreign income can be mon-
itored for tax purposes, the optimal tax structure would simply be a tax on the world—wide
capital income earned on each domestic resident's shares in domestic corporations, and no
tax on foreign shares in domestic corporations. This results in a residence—based capital
income tax and no source—based tax, as the theory shows to be optimal. No coordination
of tax policy among countries is needed to achieve this outcome. The residence—based tax
can consist of any combination of personal income taxes and corporate taxes, where in
each case the tax base would be the domestically owned world—wide capital income of the
individual or firm.8
This policy not only allows international diversification of the portfolio holdings of
domestic residents through foreign investments by domestic corporations, but also permits
the market rather than the government to determine the allocation of domestic savings
between investments at home vs. abroad. Allowing corporate capital flows also enables
firms to take advantage of potential synergy gains from mergers with foreign corporations,
facilitating the transfer of technology and other information across countries.
But even this form of capital controls is unlikely to remain an attractive mechanism to
preserve capital income taxes. Any government's control over capital flows is limited
borders are porous, and increasingly so. If individuals expend resources to evade controls,
this use of resources is an additional cost of controls. In spite of the fact that several of the
countries in the European Community have used capital controls in the past, the Commu-
nity has agreed to eliminate them as part of its economic integration plans. Presumably,
the same pressures elsewhere will undennine reliance on capital controls.
7Capital controls, even where they have been used, cannot explain the pattern of capital
income taxes that exist, since, the tax structure implied by the above discussion differs
substantially from existing tax structures. In theory, domestic operations of foreign—owned
corporations would not be taxed, but foreign operations of domestically—owned corpora-
tions would be taxed on an accrual basis. However, existing corporate taxes apply equally
to all domestic operations, regardless: of ownership. Many countries also tax the foreign
earnings of domestic corporations, but normally allow firms a credit for foreign corporate
taxes already paid on this income (up to the amount of domestic taxes due). In the next
section, I derive the equilibrium tax structure that should result given these crediting pro-
visions. Under the above assumptions, this tax structure will be less attractive than the
une just described. However, I also find that when individuals can in fact invest abroad
directly, and thereby can evade domestic taxes, then the outcome with these crediting
provisions may indeed look more attractive.
2. Equilibrium corporate income taxes under existing double taxation conventions
In examining the equilibrium choices of capital income taxes under existing conventions,
I make several simplifying assumptions. First, I assume that the home country taxes the
foreign earnings of domestic corporations at accrual rather than at repatriation.9 Second,
I assume that govermnents cannot levy personal income taxes on the net—of—corporate—
tax equity income that individuals receive, though they can grant rebates as is done with
dividend credit schemes.1° This forces countries to raise their corporate tax rate in order
to tax capital income more heavily. Finally, for simplicity I assume that there are many
identical capital—importing countries, and many identical capital—exporting countries.
Let us examine first the Nash equilibrium in corporate tax rates.1' Let t represent the
tax rate chosen by capital exporters, and let tmbethe rate chosen by capital importers.
In equilibrium, each country must find its choice optimal taking as given the rate chosen
by other countries.
I examine first the situation of the capital—importing countries. Since each country i
small relative to the world capital market, it takes as given the required rate of return on
capital imports. Given the double—taxation convention, owners of this capital pay a tax
Srate equal to max(tx,tm). What they receive oet of tax must at least equal r, the assumed
going rate of return. If fK represents the domestic marginal product of capital in these
countries, then capital is imported until
fK[1 —max(tr,tm)]= r. (2)
Denote the amount of capital imports by I, where K =S+ I. What the country must pay
for capital imports then equals [fK(i —tm)]I,which by equation (2) equals {max[r, r(1 —
tm)/(1
—t1))}I.
The choice problem of the government is then to maximize U(r*,w*) + V(C) subject
to the resource constraint
S + f(K, L) =C+ C + {max[r,r(1 —tm)I(1 — t)]}I. (3)
Since personal income taxes on equity must be nonpositive, there is the further constraint
that rfK(l
—tm)In order to understand the nature of the solution, consider first
a marginal change in tm when tm < t. By equation (2), a marginal increase in tm does
not change K. For a given ', this increase therefore is a clear gain, since it raises more
revenue from the fixed capital imports. Since r* need not be changed, taking into account
any effects on r only strengthens this conclusion. Therefore, tm ￿ t. What if tm were
increased above t1? Now equation (2) implies that fjc(l tm) is fixed. The feasible values
of r* therefore do not change, but I falls. A fall in I, however, causes a drop in welfare
since fK > r. Therefore, at the optimum tm =tx.
Let us now examine the tax rates chosen by the capital—exporting countries. These
countries take tm as given. Assume in analyzing this case that no corporate tax rebates are
granted under the personal income tax —raisingthe corporate tax but then rebating the
increase accomplishes nothing since only domestically owned corporations are subject to




where a small capital—exporting country takes fic as given. If capital exports equal F, so
that S =K+ F, then total receipts from these capital exports eqoal fK(1 —tm)F.The
9government therefore chooses its policies so as to maximize U(r*, w*) + V(G) subject to
g(K, L) + fK(i —tm)E= c+c, (3a)
where r* =gK(1
—ti).
If i Ctm,what is the effect on welfare of a marginal increase in t? Equation (2a)
shows that the value of r* does not change, but that domestic investment falls. Equation
(3a) then implies, given r*, that a fall in K causes welfare to fall since gj< >fK(i
—tm).
Therefore, welfare falls as t rises as long as t < t,fl.
If t1, ￿im,what is the effect on welfare of a marginal increase? Equation (2a) now
implies that domestic investment does not change, hut that r falls. This increased tax
rate on income from savings, both foreign and domestic, may well cause welfare to increase,
at least initially. Eventually as t increases, welfare should reach a local maximum.
The effects of changes in t on welfare is portrayed graphically in Figure 1. The figure
implies that the optimal value of 11 will be either zero or t*; it can never be t,,,. But this
implies that there is no Nash equilibrium set of tax rates in pure strategies, since capital
importing countries always set tm =
Historically, changes in corporate tax rates have occurred roughly simultaneously among
the major industrialized countries, most recently around 1986. Given this pattern, it seems
of interest to examine a Stackelberg equilibrium as well. The U.S. may plausibly have
played such a role in the world market, or Germany such a role within the E.C. In theory,
the Stackelberg leader could be either a capital exporter or a capital importer. I explore
both cases.
Gonsider first a large exporter acting as the leader. For simplicity, assume that this
country is the only capital exporter.'2 When the leader increases t1, it realizes that the
capital importing countries will raise their owo tax rates accordingly, maintaining the
equality tm = t. From the investor's perspective, it is as if the country were using a
residence—based tax. The government, however, cedes the tax revenue on capital exports
to the other govermnents. Losing this tax revenue reduces the gain from raising capital—
income tax rates, so the optimal rate should be below that chosen under a true residence—
based tax. But the tax could still be used.
10How does the story change if the leader is a large capital importer? In response to any
choice of in, what do the capital exporting countries do? As noted above, their optimal
tax rate is either zero or the i5 seen in Figure 1. Changing in therefore causes a change
in policy elsewhere only if i were the optimal rate and i changes, or if these countries
switch between one locally optimal policy and the other.
It is easy to show that raising i,, raises i. Ftom the perspective of the government in
an exporting country, the cost of raising i is in large part the revenue loss that occurs due
to the resulting fall in domestic savings. Since extra savings all go abroad, this revenue
loss is (i5 —in)fK(OS/&x).If in were higher, this term becomes less important, and the
locally optimal i would be higher.
How would a rise in in affect which locally optimal policy is chosen? Raising in lowers
the utility of the capital exporting country due to the drop in the rate of return, fjc(l —in),
earned on capital exports. The size of the drop in utility depends on the size of capital
exports. When i is zero, g = fK(l —in),whereas YK = fK when i = i, suggesting
that capital exports are larger at i. However, total domestic savings should be smaller
when ix is higher. Assuming the latter effect is less important, utility at i drops more
when in is raised, implying that eventually the capital exporting country would shift to
ixOasin israised.
Given these responses, what value of in would the capital importing country choose?
It woujd certainly choose a rate so that the exporting countries set ix equal to i, rather
than to zero. When 1n is increased, more revenue is obtained from existing imports, but
the amount of imported capital falls due to the fall in world—wide savings. Either this drop
is in itself large enough to put an upper bound on in, or else i,, is raised just to the point
where a further increase causes capital—exporting countries to drop i1 from i to zero.
What can be said about the welfare generated in capital—exporting and capital—importing
countries in these equilibria? When the capital—exporter is the leader, all countries are
better off than they would be with no taxes on capital income. However, capital importers
would gain from a yet higher rate, since they get to keep the extra tax revenue on their
capital imports, implying that there would be gains from further tax coordination.
When the capital—importing country is the leader, the outcome is less clear. Certainly,
11the capital—importer is better off than with no capital income taxes, but the capital ex-
porter is likely to be worse off. Note, for example, that utility at t = 0 is lower when
taxes are imposed by the capital—importing country. Yet if the capital importing country I
raises its tax rate until t is about to drop to zero, then the capital exporters receive the
same utility in equilibrium as they would if t, = 0, implying that the capital—exporting
countries are worse off.
Do these equilibria have any advantages over the previous equilibrium, in which only
corporations, not individuals, could invest abroad and governments taxed only the income
earned by their own residents? Capital—exporting countries are worse off, since they give
up the tax revenue on their capital exports. Even if capital—importing countries are better
off, direct transfers from the capital—exporting countries would provide a Pareto superior
approach to aid these countries.
The key advantage of this equilibrium over the previous one is that it need not be
undermined by individuals being able to invest abroad without detection. In the previous
case, if individuals could invest abroad, they would invest all their funds abroad in order
to avoid taxes imposed on the world—wide income of domestic corporations. A small host
country for these investments would not choose to tax them, implying that all capital—
income taxes would disappear if portfolio flows could not be prevented.
The Stackelberg equilibrium in which the capital exporter is the leader is not directly
vulnerable to individual portfolio flows, even if these flows cannot be detected. From the
perspective of the capital exporter, all capital exports generate fic(l —tm)in revenue,
none of which is paid in domestic taxes, regardless of whether corporations or individuals
undertake the investment. Individual investors earn the same net return both at home
and abroad. In a capital—importing country, residents earn at least as high a net return
at home as abroad, doing equally well only when r*=fK(1 —1).In the latter case,
the government earns the same tax revenue regardless of where residents invest, since it
taxes all domestic capital and the domestic capital stock is set based on the equilibrium
condition fK=YK, where a small economy takes YK as given.
The key complication, however, is that with unrestricted individual portfolio flows,
the incentives of the government in a capital—importing country change. With respect to
12capital imports generated by portfolio flows, the tax tm is simply a source—based tax, so has
an optimal value of zero. Capital—income taxes can still survive, however, if the capital—
exporting country gives its residents a suitably large dividend credit for dividends received
from domestic corporations, which discourages portfolio investments abroad. If a capital—
importing country now eliminates its capital income tax, in order to attract the optimal
amount of portfolio investment, it pays gK(l —m+ d) per unit of imported capital, where
d is the dividend credit received by investors in the capital—exporting country, and imports
capital until f,<=gK(l —tm+ d). If instead it maintains its capital income tax, it pays
gK(1 —ti) per unit of imported capital, and imports capital until fK = YK. When tm = 0,
it pays more per unit of imported capital, but gets to import more capital. If d equals
zero, the country clearly does better by setting tm =0.When d is high enough, however,
it will prefer to set tm =tr.The use of dividend credits results in an even larger transfer
of revenue to the capital—importing country, relative to the case of a residence—based tax
system, implying yet lower net tax rates on capital iucome in equilibrium.
Capital income taxes may still survive in the Stackelberg equilibrium, even with indi-
vidual portfolio flows, and produce a higher utility for all countries than occurs without
capital—income taxes. The equilibrium results in a variety of pressures, however. For
example, the capital—exporting country finds the marginal product of capital invested at
home to be higher than that earned on capital exports, net of foreign taxes. One possi-
ble response, noted by Findlay(1986), would be to introduce subsidies for domestic but
not foreign investment.13 Similarly, in a capital—importing country, the cost per unit of
imported capital is less than the marginal product of this capital. As a result it has the
incentive to subsidize further capital imports, as long as these subsidies are not credited
against the foreign corporation's domestic taxes.
This equilibrium can also be improved on through further tax coordination. For exam-
ple, if the capital—importing countries transferred back to the capital—exporting countries
the revenue that they collect on imported capital, as proposed in Giovannini—Hines(1990),
then the outcome is exactly equivalent to that which occurs with residence—based taxes. A
move in this direction would be a Pareto improvement if the capital—importing countries
were allowed to keep their current revenue from the taxation of capital imports but must
13transfer back to the capital—exporting country any changes in this revenue resulting from
the agreement. The capital—exporting country is then simply making a lump—sum transfer
to the capital—importing countries, which does not change the conditions determining its
optimal tax rates.
3. Equilibrium withholding tax rates under existing double—taxation conventions
The above Stackelberg equilibrium is not the only approach that might be taken to facil-
itate capital income taxation. Capital—exporting countries might set up double—taxation
conventions to deal with the taxation of foreign portfolio income earned by domestic res-
idents. Such conventions, specifying crediting schemes for foreign taxes paid on income
from financial assets held abroad, do in fact exist. Typically, each government taxes its
residents on their world—wide portfolio income, but grants a credit towards domestic tax
liabilities for any foreign taxes (referred to below simply as withholding taxes) already paid
on this income. The credit cannot exceed the domestic taxes that would be due on this
foreign income, however. This section examines the equilibrium that results, given this
convention.
In this setting, each country is trying to tax the capital income of its own residents, and
to tax any income from domestic financial securities accruing to foreigners. (No corporate
taxes are used.) Let s(sm)denote the tax rates imposed on the world—wide capital
income of domestic residents in capital—exporting (capital—importing) countries, and let
ltx (nm) denote the withholding tax rate imposed on earnings of imported capital.
The analysis of this problem differs from that in the previous section because the home
government remains unable to monitor the foreign capital income of domestic residents,
even though it can monitor the income of domestic corporations. Individuals will therefore
report their foreign earnings to their home government only if they gain by doing so. Yet
existing conventions do not allow any rebate from the home government in response to
large foreign tax payments, only a forgiveness of any additional domestic taxes. Therefore,
domestic investors never have an incentive to report foreign earnings, implying that any
foreign tax collected on their earnings is simply a source—based tax. As seen earlier, a
small open economy would not use a source—based tax.
14In order for the treaty to change behavior, domestic investors must have some incentive
to report their foreign earnings. Assume, therefore, that in order to evade domestic taxes
on foreign earnings, individuals must spend resources of c per unit of capital exports; there
is no such cost without evasion.14 If the foreign financial security has a pretax rate of return
of r, then investors in a capital—importing country receive a net return of r(l —rim)
—cif
they evade taxes, and r[l —max(rim,sr)] if they do not.
As before, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The key elements of the
argument closely parallel those used in the previous section, and are not repeated. Let
us turn instead to examine the outcome when a capital exporter acts as the Stackelberg
leader.
To do this, it is necessary to examine first how capital—importing countries respond to
any set of policies chosen by the capital—exporting country. Given n and 5r what policies
would a capital—importing country choose? Given its policies, foreign investors must be
able to earn the going rate of return, r, net of tax. If they report their earnings, they
receive a rate of return fjç]1 —max(sr,nm)],whereas if they evade domestic taxes, they
instead receive fK(l —rim)
—c.They choose whichever is more attractive, so that
max{fjc[l —max(s1,rim)], fK(1 —rim)
—c)=r. (4)
Similarly, when residents of the country save, they can either invest at home, earn-
ing fK(l —sm),or they can invest abroad,'5 where their return would be max{gK[l —
max(sm,ni)], gK(l —n)





The government then chooses the two tax rates so as to maximize U(r, in) subject to the
resource constraint
S+f(K,L)fK(lnm)I+C+G, (6)
where K = S + 1.16
Consider first its choice of rim. If rim < s —c/fK,then foreign investors evade their
domestic taxes, so that fix = (r + c)/(l —rim),implying a cost per unit of imported
15capital of r + c. Holding r* constant, increasing m leaves unchanged the cost per unit of
imported capital, but causes a fall in I, which is a welfare loss. Welfare therefore falls as
nm increases in this range.
If s —c/fK<rim <si, then foreign investors no longer evade domestic taxes. There-
fore, fK = r/(1 —sr),and the cost per unit of imported capital is r(l —nm)/(1
—Sr)
Increasing nm in this range does not change the amount of capital imported, but reduces
the cost of this imported capital, a welfare gain.
Finally, if rim > s, then 1K =r/(l
—nm)and the cost per unit of imported capital is
simply r. Increasing nm further is a net welfare loss, since imports decline and fK > r.
These results are portrayed graphically in Figure 2. As seen in the Figure, the only
possible values of nm are 0 and s. Shifting from nm = 0 to m = 5r causes the cost per
unit of imported capital to decline but the amount of imported capital also declines. The
welfare comparison is shown graphically in Figure 3. Here, the net profits generated from
imported capital when rim = 0 are measured by the area ABC; when rim =5rthe net
profits are ADEF. The higher is c relative to s, the less attractive is setting nm =0.
What about the choice of Sm?Ifthe optimal nm =0,then domestic investors can
always invest in other capital—importing countries free of tax. Therefore, sm is simply a
source—based tax, so should not be used.
What is the optimal value of 5mifrim =sr?As long as s,,, < n + c/gk, domestic
residents do not evade taxes. There may well be an interior optimum for 5mwithinthis
range. Within this range use of 5mismore attractive than it woald be under a residence—
based tax system. Normally, the main cost of raising 5m is the revenue loss from the
resulting fall in savings. Yet when imported capital substitutes for domestic savings, this
revenue loss is only (Sm— nm)fK(ÔS/OSm)it is reduced (and may even be negative)
because the government collects tax at rate nm on the imported capital that replaces
foregone savings.
If sm =nr+ c/gK, then any further increase in 5mcausesdomestic residents to shift to
evading domestic taxes. The country taxes domestic capital income at rate 5m= +c/gK
when domestic residents own it, but at rate rim =srwhen foreign residents own it. When
s, > n + c/gK, capital flight will be encouraged, and conversely.
16Given these results, how should the capital exporting country behave? To begin with,
it should not set s so high that capital—importing countries act as tax havens, setting
nm = 0 and m= oBetter to set s, =rs1=0—capital—importingcountries still set
mm= m = 0,but the fixed costs c required by tax evasion are avoided.
Assume, therefore, that s is small enough to prevent capital flight by domestic res-
idents. Given this, consider the country's choice of n. If r <3r—c/gjç,then the 3m
would normally be set to encourage capital flight by foreign residents.'7 But being a tax
haven is unattractive under these circumstances. The tax rate on inflows of capital is m.
This inflow of capital will be offset by an equal amount of domestic savings moving abroad
so as to maintain the equilibrium condition (4). This domestic savings had been taxed
at rate si,, and pays nothing in taxes when invested abroad. This cross—hauling therefore
results in a net revenue loss, implying that mx ￿ 5r —c/gK.
If m > s —c/gK,however, then there is an incentive to reduce it. Doing so either
leaves sm unchanged or causes it to fall. But a fall in 8m should cause foreign savings
to rise, leading to less capital exports. Since the net rate of return on capital exports is
only gK(i —sx),compared with a net return of g- at home, a drop in capital exports
is a welfare gain. Therefore, m will be set equal to 3x —c/gK.One implication is that
8m￿ Sr.
What about the choice of sr? The optimal value of r will be below the optimal
value of a true residence—based tax, if it were feasible, due to three separate effects. First,
under the double—taxation convention the capital—importing countries get to keep the tax
revenue collected on capital exports, whereas this revenue would be retained by the capital—
exporting country under a residence—based tax. Without this revenue, a tax increase i
less attractive. Second, when 3r increases, so do o and mm. These increases result in
a rise in 8m, and a fall in foreign savings. Capital exports increase to offset this drop in
savings, leading as before to a fall in welfare. Finally, .s must remain small enough to
prevent capital—importing countries from setting tmm =0and becoming tax havens.
The equilibrium under the treaty therefore has the following characteristics. First, r
is below the value that would be chosen under a residence—based tax. The equivalent tax
rate in the capital importing countries can be no higher: 3m ￿5xFinally, mm = 8r, while
mr=sr—c/gjç.
17There would be a variety of potential gains from further coordination of taxes. As be-
fore, if each country returns any revenue it obtains from taxing capital imports to the gov-
ernment of the country where the capital originates, then the outcome is residence—based
taxation. More limited types of tax coordination would also be possible. For example,
countries could set the withholding tax rates by treaty, then allow decentralized choice of
Smand5r
Thetax parameters in any such Stackelberg equilibrium depend critically on the value
of the parameter c, which measures the cost of evading domestic taxes on foreign—source
income. A fall in c forces a fall in all tax rates —whenc equals zero, so do all capital—
income tax rates. Yet the value of c itself results from decisions made by governments in
both capital—exporting and capital—importing countries. If one country, e.g. Switzerland,
created a mechanism to lower c for investments channeled through this country, then all
foreign investment any place in the world would he channeled through this country unless
capital—income taxes were reduced by enough world—wide to compensate for this fall in
c. A diversity of values of e across investors would lead to more complicated equilibria,
in which governments potentially concede that investors with low values of c would evade
taxes, while still attempting to tax those with higher values of c.
Capital—exporting countries would have the incentive to invest resources in enforcement
in order to raise the value of c. Such expenditures result in an increase in tax rates,
potentially benefiting all countries. As a result, there would be potential gains from the
coordination of tax enforcement. The value of c could be increased, for example, by
agreements to share information among national tax authorities. Such agreements may
not be very effective, however, unless they are universal.
A group of countries seeking to coordinate tax enforcement measures can prevent a tax
haven from undermining this agreement through a variety of mechanisms. For example,
this group of countries can specify a withholding tax at a rate at least equal to s on
any payments made to the tax haven. Such a tax does not discourage capital from being
invested in the tax haven, but does prevent the evasion of taxes on real investments made
within the group of countries. Such a withholding tax does require coordination, since each
country in isolation has no incentive to impose it. Alternatively, the group of countries can
'Sagree to impose capital controls preventing capital flows to any tax haven. Certainly, at
the margin this would he attractive, since the net return in equilibrium to real investments
in the tax haven is below the marginal product of capital within the group of countries.
4
Theoptimal controls would prevent capital flows unless the net return from investments
in the tax haven were at least equal to the marginal product of capital at home.18
The types of tax coordination that occur through the double—taxation conventions
dealing with corporate taxes and with withholding taxes, described in the last two sections,
are really complementary. Coordination of corporate taxes alone is insufficient, given that
corporate bonds would provide a tax haven. Similarly, coordination of taxation of dividends
and interest income in itself is insufficient, given that corporate retentions would serve as a
tax haven. I do not try to analyze explicitly the equilibrium in the combined case, however.
4. Further coordination of capital income taxes
If countries could coordinate their tax policies fully, allowing lump—sum payments be-
tween countries to compensate for any lost transfers, what would be the outcome? Razin—
Sadka(1989) show under the same types of assumptions used above that the outcome is
simply residence—based taxes. These taxes generate externalities only to the degree to
which a tax change results in a change in the market interest rate.'9 Yet a small open
economy has no ability to affect the market interest rate.
Are there mechanisms other than those discussed above to achieve the same result as
occurs with full coordination? Cooperative game theory suggests that a mutually beneficial
set of policies might be supported through implicit threats which are exercised whenever a
country violates an agreement. Alternatively, an explicit treaty might be signed specifying
all tax rates. Yet, in both cases, the entire tax structure must be specified, either implicitly
or explicitly. Civen the enormous complexity of capital income tax law in any developed
country, this hardly seems like a realistic option. In any case, most countries would be
loathe to cede their sovereignty in determining the characteristics of their capital—income
tax structure.
Coordination of tax policies is hampered by the fact that explicit negotiations inevitably
take place among two or at best a few countries. Important discussions are currently going
19on, for example, among the twelve members of the E.C. But in the previous analysis, the
equilibrium policies would remain unchanged if twelve small countries unite (for purposes
of policy—making) into one "country," assuming it still remains small relative to the world
capital market. In theory, then, there should not be important gains from coordination
within any small group.2°
The survival of capital—income taxation to date, in spite of the substantial openness of
most developed economies, may well be due to the types of double—taxation conventions
used by many countries. However, as seen above, the equilibrium tax structure with
these conventions can be rather delicate. There is an appealing Stackelberg equilibrium
tax structure if there is a dominant capital exporter that acts as the Stackelberg leader.
During much of the postwar period, the U.S. was the dominant capital exporter and
may well have served as the Stackelberg leader with regard to capital—income—tax policy.
World capital markets are now much more complex, however, with the U.S. now a capital
importer and no one country a dominant capital exporter. Whether these double—taxation
conventions will continue to be sufficient to allow capital—income taxation to survive in
this more complex environment, or whether alternative mechanisms of coordination will
be found, is an open question.
k
20FOOTNOTES
1. Such controls could be a rational response of an optimizing government to the
difficulties faced in taxing capital income, as argued by Razin—Sadka(1990). See below for
further discussion.
2. See, for example, Lovely(1989) or Sinn(1990).
3. Eliminating capital income taxes at source may make taxation of labor income much
more difficult, however, since labor income taxes could be avoided simply by reclassifying
the income flow as capital income. This would be particularly easy for self—employed
entrepreneurs. Consumption taxes would not suffer from this problem, bowever, and in
theory have the same incidence.
4. Gordon—Varian(1989) show, however, that when the risk generated by the capital
in each country is unique, then countries have market power in the international equities
market. Their optimal response could well involve imposing source—based capital income
taxes.
5. As noted, for example, in Slemrod(1988), if countries differ in the relative tax rates
they impose on income from different types of assets, then arbitrage possibilities arise
which in general could lead to negative taxable income in all countries. Investors simply
invest in assets which are taxed relatively favorably in their country and "go short" in
assets which are taxed relatively unfavorably. This arbitrage pressure should force the
equalization across countries of the relative tax treatment of different types of assets.
6. Many European governments, however, attempt to preserve the secrecy of individual
bank accounts and individual stock—holdings. Unless foreign and domestic holders can be
distinguished, even a tax on the aggregate income from these sources becomes simply a
source—based tax, so should not be used.
7. Gordon—Slemrod(1988) in fact found that the U.S. lost revenue in 1983 from its
attempt to tax income from savings and investment.
8. Due to the difficulty of taxing capital gains on corporate equity at accrual, corporate
taxes are defended as a means of preventing the tax structure from favoring corporate over
non—corporate investments.
219. In the latter case, Hartman(1985) showed that the outcome effectively involves
source—based taxes; previous results immediately imply that source—based taxes will not
be used. See Auerbach(1988), however, for a proposed scheme for imposing a tax at
repatriation which duplicates the incentives of an accrual—based tax.
10.Inmany E.C. countries, hank secrecy laws prevent the government from indepen-
dently monitoring the equity income of each individual. As a result, individuals would
likely report such income only if doing so is advantageous. They will therefore report it to
receive a rebate, but not to pay further taxes. Even in the U.S., personal taxes on equity
income can in theory be avoided if profits are not paid out as dividends and shares are
held until death, thereby avoiding capital—gains taxes.
11. For a related discussion, see Bond—Samuelson(198S). Many details differ in their
paper, though they also find no Nash equilibrium.
12. Allowing for other exporters, who continue to behave according to the above rules,
leads to heterogeneous policies among exporters, which induces heterogeneous policies
among importers as well. The formal analysis of this case is more complicated, but the
basic insights remain the same. The market power of the single exporter does not in itself
have much effects on the story. In the Nash case, allowing the exporter to have market
power only accentuated the problem. To make use of this power, the exporter would
want to restrict exports. Inspection shows that, as a result, raising t becomes even less
attractive when t, ct7fl,and more attractive when t,, >tyfl
13. In the U.S., for example, the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation
were available only for capital located in the U.S.
14. For example, buying foreign securities through domestic financial intermediaries
is very easy, but can in principle be monitored by the domestic tax authorities. Using
a foreign financial intermediary may assure evasion of domestic taxes, but is much less
convenient.
15. For simplicity, I assume that they would invest in the capital exporting country.
This assumption will be supported, given the later results.
16. If domestic residents invest abroad, then there is an additional term in equation 6.
17. The above results showed that there was a local gain from raising 8m above n +
c/gK in this case, but not necessarily that this was the global optimum.
2218. Unlike investments at home, investments in the tax haven do not result in any tax
revenue, so are less attractive everything else equal.
19. This discussion ignores the implications of labor mobility. If individuals whose
capital income is taxed relatively heavily can simply move without cost to a country where
tax rates are lower, then tax competition between countries would drive capital income tax
rates to zero. Additional factors, such as mobility costs or costs of providing services to new
residents, would then be needed to allow capital income taxes to survive in equilibrium.
20. There may still be potential gains from sharing information about individuals'
capital income among these governments, if evasion had been easier within the group than
outside the group. Also, coordinating the definitions of taxable income among the member
countries eliminates the need for firms to keep multiple "books."
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